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#### **Building a Robust Research Commons:**

#### **Enhancing the Precompetitive Environment**

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#### Introduction


- Precompetitive research: <u>improving the tools</u> and techniques for successful translational research (Woodcock, 2010)
- Current institutional and rule-based impediments to developing bioresources
- 2 Empirical Studies:
  - Canadian Stem Cell Network
  - Mouse Models for Human Disease


# **Building a Robust Research Commons**



- Databases and biorepositories to support research
- Commons is a shared and managed resource that is vulnerable to social dilemmas
- A set of resources available to all researchers on terms that encourage efficiency, equitable use and sustainability that is managed by groups of varying sizes and interests

# Thinking about the Commons





# Differences between research and natural commons

- the main issue facing research commons is underuse
- the value of a research commons is enhanced as more people use the resource - "network effect"
- global rather than local in scope
- a global research commons must be managed to facilitate not only use, but also re-contribution from the user community, creating a feedback loop between withdrawal, value-added research, and deposit

#### Rules in Use: (Focus on IP and Sharing)

- FORMAL LAWS (IP, animal welfare, FDA)
  - Often out of sync with new capabilities, community norms and technology

#### CONSTITUTIONAL

Who may make the rules (e.g., institutional structures: PPPs, consortia, repositories, databases, etc.)

#### POLICIES AND GUIDELINES


 E.g., funding agencies, universities, journals, repositories, creative/science commons

#### INFORMAL RULES/ COMMUNITY NORMS/ PRACTICES

Citation, attribution, reciprocity and sharing, publication,

# Requirements for a Robust Commons (Elinor Ostrom)

- Cultural homogeneity
- Rules that match the structure of the community and desired outcomes.
- Active participation
- Some autonomy in rule making.
- System for self-monitoring of behaviour.
- Graduated system of sanctions.
- access to low-cost resolution mechanisms.




#### The Problem with Current Rules in Use

- No doubt of increasing commercialization pressure on publicly funded research institutions and their researchers
- Mediated through technology transfer offices
- Patenting as a proxy for commercialization and a signal of changing values and norms of a community (of users)
- Impact on community norms and trust?
- Impact on sharing/willingness to contribute to and use a resource?

# Metrics aligned with commercialization objectives

- Matched to commercialization-based outcomes
- You get what you measure. Measure the wrong thing and you get the wrong behaviors."


- John H. Lingle





#### **Current Metrics**

- Economic
  - (OECD,
  - National Stats Offices)
- Aggregated
- Input/output
- Direct vs. indirect
- Correlation
- Simplistic
- Based on pipeline model



#### **Metrics** driver

- Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) Metrics
  - Out the door
    - Licenses
    - Spin-offs
  - Revenue-generationLicensing revenueCashed-in equity



#### **Encouraging Behaviours?**

- Patenting
- Licensing for revenue generation
- Start-up Creation

#### **Impacts?**

- Patent Thicket
- Culture of Science
- Access / Clinical Application
- = Institutional and systemic inertia







# Impacts on Science Culture CASE 1: Stem Cell Network (Bubela *et al.* Cell Stem Cell, 2010)

- Examine the impact of patenting and startup company involvement on academic collaborations measured through coauthorship
- Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE)
  - to facilitate networking, research excellence, and commercialization of network funded research

#### **Conclusions of SCN Study**

(Bubela et al. Cell Stem Cell, in press)

- SCN researchers exhibit a high degree of collaboration both nationally and internationally.
- Some collaboration patterns were best explained by institutional affiliation, research quality and seniority.
- BUT Patenting negatively impacted collaboration.
- Collaboration/commercialization may be antagonistic.
- Field will require significant incubation in academia before it is ready for primetime.

## 2. Creating Bioresource and Data Research Platforms – Lessons from The Mouse Commons

- New multi-stakeholder collaborations need to be supported by data and bioresource sharing institutions and infrastructure.
- Explosion in mutant mouse strains, in part the product of a coordinated high-throughput community project, the International Knockout Mouse Consortium (IKMC)
- Traditional modes of sharing data and bioresources are no longer adequate to the scale or nature of the task required

#### NorCOMM - EUCOMM - KOMP

- Public Resources established to provide public and private research communities with a source of Knockout Mice and Embryonic Stem cells
  - Knockout Mice lack two copies
     of a specific gene and therefore do
     not produce the protein the gene
     encodes
  - Embryonic Stem cells are used to produce Knockout mice



#### **Research Question**


 Does the legacy of basic research patents created under current laws and practices hinder the establishment of public sector resources?




## Mouse Patent Landscape: Method

- Delphion search US Granted Patents
  - Patents involving DNA (modified Cook-Deegan search algorithm)
  - AND Mouse search terms in claims
  - AND NOT Plant\*
- Resulted in 6,979 patents
  - Examined claims of each patent
- Coded each 'accepted' patent (2,373 34%)
- 952 patented genes identified through Blast analysis

#### Status and filing date of 816 Mouse Gene Patents (US)



#### Publications (>100) associated with patented versus unpatented mouse genes



### METHODS PATENTS CODING Problematic for construction of resource

- Coding frame developed with experts
- Include product
- Broad/specific method
  - •BAC
  - Positive/negative
  - selection
  - •FLP/FRT Recombinase
  - Isogenic DNA
  - Recombineering
  - Electroporation
  - •PhiC31

- Cryopreservation
- Gateway Technology
- •Cre/Lox
- •inverse PCR
- •F0/F1mouse
- Vector
- Homologous

Recombination

- Method used in Gene Trapping/Targeting
- •Total = 105 Patents coded



## Litigation: A sure way to destroy trust

- Current litigation:
- 2010 Markman Hearing: THE CENTRAL INSTITUTE FOR EXPERIMENTAL ANIMALS, a Japanese corporation, (Plaintiff) v.
   THE JACKSON LABORATORY, a Maine corporation (Defendant)
  - "NOD/Shi Mouse" and "NOD/Shi-scid Mouse"
- 2010 Demand for Jury Trial: Alzheimer's Institute of America, Inc (Plaintiff) v. Elan Corporation, PLC, Eli Lilly and Company, ANASPEC Inc, Immuno-Biological Laboratories, INC., Invitrogen Corp., The Jackson Laboratory, and Phoenix Pharmaceuticals (Defendants)
  - Swedish Mutation, etc.






- Large number of overlapping patents both on products and methods.
- Most gene and DNA patents held by public sector, most cell lines and mice by private sector.
- Methods patents may be more of a blocking problem in the long-term than product patents
- Public resources are being established, however patents may impact on repositories and users, especially as research moves towards clinical application.
- Utility of maintaining and EXPENSE of public sector patents on research tools?
- Most important is change in CULTURE, collaboration, sharing ethos, competition and trust

# Community identified problems with rules in use

- Material Transfer Agreements identified by the community as a substantial disincentive to accessing and providing materials
- Researchers should be free to breed mice for research purposes and cross-breed them to produce new strains (added value back to commons)
  - Rome Agenda Schofield et al. 2009 Nature



#### The Rome Agenda:

Post-publication sharing of data and tools Schofield, Bubela et al. *Nature* 461, 171-173

- Access to data and materials
- Licensing and patenting
- Data and resource-sharing infrastructure
- Standards and tool development
- Attribution and reward
- BUT: policies are one thing and enforcement another

#### Conclusions

- The movement to implement a true science commons based on community norms has gathered considerable momentum.
- A combination of existing community norms, rule development, incentive structures, and adequate enforcement will all contribute to a research commons.
- Influencing the other actors in the game, the funding agencies, research institutions, TTOs and journals is the next major challenge.
- Industry, through use of the resource, can only enhance the value of the resource and add to potential sustainability





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- Dr Richard Gold, McGill University
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- Dr Robert Cook-Deegan, Duke University
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